Undergraduate studies at the Charles University in philosophy and psychology. Candidate of Sciences, Charles University. Philosophy and Logic, Masaryk University Brno. Docent, Masaryk University Brno.
Electronic Philosopher "Some of the most precious documents we possess about the Modern philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz are the letters they wrote. To all and sundry.
People who were asking them about their philosophy. Students they took on I had this idea that if at some future date someone was going to collect my works, I wouldn't be embarrassed to see the letter, amongst those works Frege's distinction between sense and reference Date: These are the two questions that you have to answer.
Of course, there are other questions one might consider. Was Frege right to distinguish between sense and reference? What is the distinction?
I have to take issue with you when you seem to imply that the distinction between sense and reference is an extension of the distinction between concept and object.
Maybe this isn't what you meant when you said, 'These ideas [concerning the analogy between concepts and mathematical functions] were applied and extended in his philosophy of language'.
A concept word can have both sense and reference, just as a proper name can.
In this case, it is clear that the difference lies in 'how one conceives of the denotation of the term'. Taking this idea to its logical conclusion, however, implies a Russellian solution to the problem of the informativeness of identity statements.
As you correctly note, Frege did not hold this view. The crucial point of difference is that the 'mode of presentation' need not be conceptualised, i.
When we take the most basic terms of the language, both terms which refer to objects i. Although in his essay 'On Sense and Reference' Frege motivates the distinction using the example of identity statements, it is clear that his aim is to account for indirect discourse. I felt that you didn't say enough here to make this convincing although I accept that this is difficult within the word limit.
How does Frege's theory explain the difference between, e. That is how it is possible, e. As we have said, these 'senses' are ontologically a distinct kind of thing from concepts.
You are right to emphasize that senses are not private impressions existing in the mind of a particular speaker, but rather are shared between speakers of the language. But how exactly does this come about? By what process do we come to recognize non-physical objects called 'senses' at the same time as we learn to recognize the physical objects that populate our world?
Given the restriction on length, I think you did a good job in explaining the essence of the idea of distinguishing sense and reference. As you will have seen from Dummett's magnificent book, this is indeed an inexhaustible topic.Results for 'denotation' (try it on Scholar) found.
Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Paradoxes and the Distinction Between Sense and Denotation. Theories of Reference in Philosophy of Language. Direct download. Export citation.
. Distinguish Between Sense Reference Denotation Philosophy Essay. Print Reference this Unlike reference, denotation does not point to the actual entity being referred to in a specific situation.
(words), denotation relates utterances to categories of entities in the world. John Lyons suggests that “sense and denotation are, in general. Results for 'denotation' (try it on Scholar) found. Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Paradoxes and the Distinction Between Sense and Denotation.
Theories of Reference in Philosophy of Language. Direct download. Export citation. My bibliography 3 citations Understanding the difference between denotation and connotation is important to understanding definitions and how concepts are used.
Unfortunately, that is complicated by the fact that these terms can be used in two different ways: grammatical and logical. Even worse, both uses are.
May 03, · Subject: Frege's distinction between sense and reference Date: 15 August Dear David, Thank you for your letter of 4th August, with your third essay for the Philosophy of Language program, in response to the question, 'What is the point of .
In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an innovation of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in (in his paper "On Sense and Reference"; German: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung"), reflecting the two ways he believed a singular term may have meaning.